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Abstract 
Using data from the recent crisis, we analyze financial linkages between market liquidity 
and bank solvency measures in advanced economies and emerging market bond and stock 
markets. A multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity model 
is estimated to gauge the extent of co-movements of these financial variables across mar-
kets. The findings indicate that the notion of possible decoupling of financial markets had 
been misplaced. In fact, interlinkages between funding stress and equity markets in ad-
vanced economies and emerging market financial indicators were highly correlated, and 
have seen sharp increases during specific crisis moments. 
1. Introduction 
The crisis began in the  United States with the  bursting of the  sub-prime 
mortgage market and the  unraveling of the  securitization process in the  summer 
of 2007, but it initially did not fully affect emerging markets (EM). EM stock mar-
kets peaked around November 2007, when the repercussions of the crisis were already 
apparent in the U.S. with central banks injecting liquidity into the interbank markets 
and major financial institutions announcing massive writedowns from structured 
financial products. 
The Lehman collapse on September 15, 2008 has been a key event, both in 
advanced economies but also EM countries. It unleashed a full-blown systemic crisis 
with global risk aversion dramatically increasing, asset markets across countries and 
regions plunging and the unwinding of carry trades that saw high-yielding EM cur-
rencies sharply depreciate within a short period of time. Even EM countries with 
sound macroeconomic and financial pre-conditions, built-up over the previous years, 
have been strongly affected by the financial contagion that in late 2008 spilled over 
to the real sector with export and GDP growth rates plunging and trade finance being 
contracting across the world. 
This paper examines the financial interlinkages between advanced and EM 
countries by focusing on the co-movements of several key financial variables. Spe-
cifically, proxies for general stress in the  interbank market, market volatility and 
default risk of major financial institutions in advanced economies are related to stock 
market, bond spreads, and CDS indices of selected EM countries. 
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Since standard correlations are potentially biased when examining spillovers 
and the potential for systemic risks to spread (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002), the Dy-
namic Conditional Correlation (DCC) Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Hetero-
skedasticity (GARCH) model by Engle (2002) is used to avoid many of the pitfalls. 
This GARCH framework allows us to analyze the co-movement of markets by in-
ferring the correlations of the changes in the financial variables examined, which in 
turn is essential in understanding whether the recent episode of financial distress has 
become systemic. 
The main findings suggest that implied correlations between the U.S. Libor- 
-Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS) spread, a proxy for funding illiquidity, and the JP 
Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI+) sovereign bond spreads of 
Asia, Europe, and Latin American countries, sharply increase following the onset of 
the  subprime crisis. In addition, the  Shanghai stock market correction in Feb-
ruary 2007 led to a temporary spike of the correlation measures, whereas the Lehman 
collapse caused the largest increase of co-movements among these variables. Sim-
ilarly, the  relationship between the  Standard & Poor’s 500 index (S&P 500) and 
the  EMBI+ regional bond spreads exhibits a  potential break during the  Chinese 
episode, after which correlations increase from the beginning of the subprime crisis, 
and reach their peak after the Lehman failure. 
In terms of individual country interlinkages, the U.S. Libor spread is related to 
sovereign bond and the sovereign CDS spreads of the EM countries Brazil, Russia, 
Turkey, Mexico, and South Africa. As before, the Shanghai stock market correction 
in February 2007 is evident, in addition to the beginnings of the subprime and the Leh-
man collapse. The Bear Stearns rescue in March 2008 also becomes visible with co- 
-movements sharply reversing their earlier downward trend. 
Overall, the findings from the DCC GARCH models indicate that the notion 
of possible decoupling (in the financial markets) had been misplaced. It is true that 
EM stock markets reached their peak around November 2007, but interlinkages be-
tween funding stress and equity markets in advanced economies and EM financial 
indicators were highly correlated and have seen sharp increases during specific crisis 
moments. Given the interconnectedness of global financial markets, investors’ in-
crease in global risk aversion from problems in advanced economies rapidly spilled 
over into EM countries, as investors sought to pull out from the latter countries and 
only invest into the safest and most liquid assets in their home markets, such as fixed 
income securities. 
The paper is related to the existing literature as follows. It builds upon Frank, 
Gonzalez-Hermosillo and Hesse (2008) that analyze liquidity spillovers across asset 
markets in the United States as well as in IMF (2008). This is also related to a sub-
stantial body literature on spillovers and contagion that was inspired by the Asian 
Crisis. The identification of channels of shock transmission across countries is, for 
instance, discussed in Dungey, Fry, Gonzalez-Hermosillo and Martin (2005), Dorn-
busch, Park and Claessens (2000) and Pericoli and Sbracia (2003). Beirne, Caporale, 
Schulze-Ghattas and Spagnolo (2008) examine volatility spillovers from mature to 
EM countries and test for their changes during crisis periods. Similarly, some other 
studies that jointly investigate spillovers of EM and mature countries are Dungey, 
Fry, Gonzalez-Hermosillo, and Martin (2006, 2007) and Kaminsky and Reinhart 
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In this context, a large body of literature investigated conditional correlations 
during crisis periods to examine possible breaks in the underlying data. Examples 
besides Forbes and Rigobon (2002) are King, Sentana, and Wadhwani (1994), King 
and Wadhwani (1990) and Caporale, Cippollini, and Spagnolo (2005). Investors' risk 
appetite can rapidly change during financial crises when suddenly nonrelated asset 
markets are impacted by seemingly unrelated financial shocks. Gonzalez-Hermosillo 
(2008) and Coudert and Gex (2007) are examples of papers that study the importance 
of risk appetite during crises periods. Finally, theoretical foundations of contagion 
are studied by Kodres and Pritzker (2002). 
This paper makes several important contributions to the emerging literature  
on financial spillovers during the current global financial crisis. It examines the daily 
co-movements between key financial variables in advanced economies, such as stress 
in the interbank market, market volatility and solvency concerns of large financial insti-
tutions with stock market, bond spread and CDS measures in EM countries. The DCC 
framework takes into account time varying volatility and addresses possible feedback 
effects since unidirectionality is not imposed. Furthermore, our findings that end- 
-February 2007 was a period where early signs of stress began to emerge in global 
markets prior to the time when the subprime crisis was revealed in mid-2007 is con-
sistent with the results of Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (2008), Gorton (2008), 
Gonzalez-Hermosillo (2008), and IMF (2008). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some of the pos-
sible transmission mechanisms of spillovers to EM countries during the global fi-
nancial crisis. Section 3 details the data selection. Section 4 discusses the empirical 
methodology. Section 5 examines the main results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Spillovers to Emerging Market Countries During the Crisis: Overview 
This section examines the role of global market conditions in the recent fi-
nancial crisis, and argues that the Lehman collapse on September 15, 2008, was a key 
event that led to rapid spillovers to emerging market countries. The event sharply 
increased uncertainty across markets and caused a  scramble for U.S.  dollars with 
the break-down of the carry trade and the need for financial institutions to refinance 
U.S. dollar positions. We start by an overview of the financial linkages across asset 
markets in the United States during the crisis, following by a discussion of some of 
the financial spillovers to EM countries. 
The subprime crisis, which began in the summer of 2007, was triggered by 
deteriorating quality of U.S. subprime mortgages – a credit, rather than a liquidity 
event.
1 This rapidly propagated across different asset classes and financial markets. 
Increased delinquencies on subprime mortgages, driven by rising interest rates for 
refinancing and falling house prices, resulted in uncertainty surrounding the value  
of a number of structured credit products which had these assets in their underlying 
portfolios. As a result, rating agencies downgraded many of the related securities and 
announced changes in their methodologies for rating such products. Meanwhile, struc-
tured credit mortgage-backed instruments measured by the ABS indices (ABX) saw 
1 See Kiff and Mills (2008) for details on the structure of the U.S. subprime mortgage market and the de-
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rapid declines, and the liquidity for initially tradable securities in their respective sec-
ondary markets evaporated. The losses, downgrades, and changes in methodologies 
shattered investors' confidence in the rating agencies' abilities to evaluate risks of 
complex securities, a result of which, investors pulled back from structured products  
in general. 
It soon became apparent that a wide range of different financial institutions 
had exposures to many of these mortgage-backed securities, often off-balance sheet 
entities such as conduits or structured investment vehicles (SIVs).
2 Due to the increas-
ing uncertainty with regard to their exposure to and the value of the underlying mort-
gage-backed securities, investors became unwilling to roll over the corresponding 
asset-back commercial paper. As the problems with SIVs and conduits deepened, 
banks came under increasing pressure to rescue those that they had sponsored by pro-
viding liquidity or by taking their respective assets onto their own balance sheets. As 
a result, the balance sheets of those financial institutions were particularly strained by 
this reabsorption, which in addition was amplified by losses due to declining asset 
values. Consequently, the level of interbank lending declined both for reasons of li-
quidity and credit risk and a run for “liquidity” occurred.
3 With the evaporation of 
liquidity in many asset-backed mortgage securities, in particular in the United States 
initially, liquidity spirals occurred where both market and funding liquidity became 
significantly impaired and mutually reinforcing (IMF,  2008; Brunnermeier,  2007). 
While the Libor-OIS spread, a proxy for stress in the interbank money markets, wid-
ened during the on-set of the crisis and under the influence of end-of-year effects in 
December 2007, the Lehman Brothers collapse exposed the interbank market to even 
more counterparty and liquidity risk, leading market participants to globally with-
draw from these market segments. Following this event, the failure of counterparties 
to honor the delivery of US Treasuries in repo transactions due to inability or unwil-
lingness drastically soared showing even more stress in funding markets.
4  
With interbank markets across advanced economies becoming dysfunctional 
in August 2007, there was clear evidence of a run for “quality” by investors. For ex-
ample, the price of gold, regarded as a storage of value in times of financial turbu-
lence, rose from $660 per ounce in August 2007 to $1,000 around the Bear Stearns 
rescue by JP Morgan and the Federal Reserve’s announcement of the Primary Credit 
Dealer Facility on March 16, 2008, after which the gold spot price dropped by 10% 
in a short time.
5 In addition, there was a strong demand for 10-year U.S. Treasuries 
as a ‘safe’ haven. Accordingly, yields almost halved between the beginning of the cri-
sis and the Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers episodes. The frequency of deviations 
from the usual bid/ask pattern of the 10-year US Treasuries also increased. 
2 The SIVs or conduits were funded through the issuance of short-term asset-backed commercial paper in 
order to take advantage of a yield differential resulting in a maturity mismatch. 
3 The former is based on a prudency motive whereby banks hoarded liquid assets in order to insure them-
selves against contingent liabilities. In contrast, the latter was due to uncertainty with regard to the mort-
gage exposure of counterparties and the inability to value their respective assets. 
4 This indicated that despite the higher supply of US Treasuries, market participants had very high demand
for US Treasury collateral and were very concerned about counterparty risk, even though governments had 
implemented a systematic response by re-capitalizing major financial institutions and guaranteeing liabili-
ties of banks. 
5 The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers saw the gold price soar over 20% within a few weeks, as global risk 
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As turbulence related to the U.S. subprime mortgages heightened, financial 
markets more generally showed signs of stress, as investor preference moved away 
from complex structured products in a  flight to quality and liquidity, and global 
investors' risk appetite sharply decreased due to a widespread re-pricing of risk (Gon-
alez-Hermosillo,  2008). Volatility in various asset classes was affected, mirroring 
the  widening of the  Libor-OIS spread. For instance, a  structural break in the  VIX 
index since the Lehman collapse is apparent, with other implied volatility equity 
indices also revealing similar patterns. An  inspection of the  at-the-money implied 
volatility of major financial institutions shows a very close co-movement with their 
respective CDS spreads.
6  
Furthermore, hedge funds that held asset-backed securities and other struc-
tured products were burdened by increased margin requirements, driven in turn by 
greater market volatility. As a consequence, they attempted to offload the more liquid 
parts of their portfolios to meet these margin calls and also respond to redemptions 
by investors. As argued by Khadani and Lo (2007), quantitatively driven hedge funds 
were especially engaged in liquidation sales across different asset classes, thus lead-
ing to a transmission of market stress in the beginning of the subprime crisis. As 
a  result, trading volumes and numbers of trades in both the  bond and the  stock 
markets in the developed and emerging countries increased markedly, whilst the li-
quidity surrounding structured investments evaporated. 
Volatility also spilled over into the foreign currency markets with the carry 
trades starting to rapidly unwind at the end of September 2008, whereby this break-
down was reflected by the implied volatilities of major EM currencies. High-yielding 
and previous investment currencies saw large depreciations against the U.S. dollar, 
while funding currencies such as the  Japanese yen benefited by a  repatriation of 
funds into Japan. There was a scramble for U.S. dollars, which was reflected in 
the higher volatility of the euro-U.S. Dollar swap rates. Relatedly, during the crisis 
there has been increasing divergence from the assumption of covered interest rate 
parity. This relationship postulates that the currency forward premium equals the in-
terest rate differentials of the home and foreign interest rate, such that a violation 
would imply possible arbitrage opportunities. The daily deviations from the covered 
interest rate parity jumped at the time of the Bear Stearns rescue, and then completely 
broke down for various EM currencies after Lehman's bankruptcy. 
EM countries were less affected during the initial stages of the subprime crisis 
than advanced economies, as for example EM equity markets peaked in Novem-
ber 2007. But the persistence of the market dislocations, the deterioration of econom-
ic fundamentals in advanced economies and rising global risk aversion significantly 
affected EM countries by late  2008. In particular, flows to EM equity and debt 
mutual funds turned negative. Total foreign assets held by the  former peaked in 
November 2007, but investments in the equivalent EM debt mutual funds began to 
fall rapidly beginning in September 2008, driven by the sharp fall in global risk ap-
petite after the Lehman collapse and fear that EM economies would be affected by 
the looming recession in advanced economies. Equity markets in EM countries saw 
their gains from the previous boom years wiped out in a short period of time. Re-
6 Humps occur at the time of the Bear Stearns rescue by JP Morgan in March 2008, during the Fannie and 
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latedly, while EM corporate spreads (over treasuries) gradually began to increase fol-
lowing the onset of the subprime crisis, they escalated sharply across the various EM 
regions after the Lehman bankruptcy. Similar behavior can be observed for the cost 
of corporate credit, especially for high-yield bonds, in the U.S. and Europe. Sover-
eign spreads and the costs of insuring against a sovereign default, CDS, soared across 
a wide range of EM countries as portfolio outflows and a flight to quality accelerated. 
EM countries with large current account deficits and whose banks prior to 
the crisis have been most reliant on foreign wholesale funding have been affected 
the most by the ramifications of the financial crisis. For instance, the IMF provided 
substantial financial support to Hungary and Ukraine (October 2008), Pakistan (No-
vember 2008) and Latvia (December 2008). EM countries such as South Korea and 
Russia, which had built up large foreign reserves prior to the crisis increasingly had 
to employ these in order to stem the currency depreciation pressures arising from 
an unwinding of portfolio positions and capital flight as well as severe strains in their 
banking sectors. 
Initial financial spillovers to EM countries quickly morphed into real sector 
problems, whereby economies reliant on declining demand and available trade fi-
nance saw their domestic industrial production and GDP growth rates plunging. In 
order to counteract the looming adverse real sector impacts as well as to provide 
liquidity and credit support to the domestic banking systems, large fiscal stimulus 
plans were implemented, such as in China for over $500 billion in November 2008. 
Interestingly, emerging market equity, fixed income, and currency markets al-
ready saw a sharp sell-off in February 2007, a relatively short-lived episode, but it 
revealed how fast and broad-based a worldwide reappraisal of risk and flight to qual-
ity can occur. Starting in late-February 2007, there was a significant correction in 
the Shanghai stock market due to an unwinding of large long equity positions. This 
reverberated across emerging and mature markets. At the  same time, the  price of 
the ABX (BBB) index (based on CDS written on subprime mortgages, investment 
grade tranche) began to decline whilst the outlook on the U.S. housing market wors-
ened further (see also IMF, 2007). In particular, carry trades in high-yielding cur-
rencies such as those of Brazil, South Africa, and Turkey, were rapidly unwound, 
causing them to decline and the yen to appreciate. In addition, implied volatilities 
across a range of other asset markets, notably fixed-income and equity, sharply in-
creased and stock markets in previously booming economies, such as China, Ma-
laysia, the Philippines, and Turkey, observed the largest declines. The fall in global 
risk appetite was broad-based without much differentiation across regions. Compared 
to equity markets, sovereign spreads across EM countries did move in tandem with 
the general market direction but were less affected. 
3. Data 
We use the daily 3-month U.S. dollar Libor-overnight index swap (OIS) spread 
as a measure for bank funding liquidity and general stress in the interbank money 
market.
7 With the onset of the subprime crisis in the summer of 2007, this market 
segment exhibited severe dislocation. In addition, S&P 500 stock market returns are 
7 Funding liquidity refers to the availability of funds such that a solvent agent is able to borrow in the mar-
ket in order to service his obligations. Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6                                    513 
included in the reduced form model, controlling for common shocks. Moreover, 
the variance serves as a proxy for market volatility. 
As a measure of the default risk of large complex financial institutions, we use 
the (unweighted) average credit default swap spread (CDS) of Citigroup, Bank of 
America, JP Morgan, Wachovia, Merill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Leh-
man Brothers, HSBC, Royal Bank of Scotland, UBS, and Deutsche Bank.
8 Regard-
ing EM financial variables, EMBI+ spreads for the regions Latin America (LAC), 
Europe and Asia are used as a measure of their respective sovereign risks. In terms of 
individual countries, we analyze the potential financial-to-financial spillovers to promi-
nent emerging market countries with open capital accounts which have seen a sig-
nificant impact due to the financial crisis. Amongst these are Brazil, Russia, Turkey, 
Mexico, and South Africa. We also relate the advanced economy indicators such as 
the Libor spread and stock market returns to the CDS spreads in Brazil, Russia, and 
Turkey. This allows us to analyze co-movements between default measures of sov-
ereign risk in EM countries and financial stress in advanced economies. 
The data sample encompasses January 3, 2003 until December 31, 2008. Unit 
root tests for the crisis period formally identify nonstationarity in the data. Therefore, 
first differences of the spreads are taken. 
The three main indicators capturing financial stress in the  U.S.  and other 
advanced economies are provided in Figure 1. Funding liquidity pressures in the in-
terbank market, as measured by the Libor-OIS spread, were negligible prior to 
the subprime crisis, after which this proxy drastically increased in late July 2007. 
Following central bank interventions in mid August, the spread subsided somewhat 
before widening again sharply, driven in part by end-of-year effects as well as by 
increased losses and writedowns of major financial institutions. In the run-up to 
the Bear Stearns rescue, heightened funding liquidity pressure again became evident, 
and finally, the Lehman failure led to an almost breakdown of the interbank money 
market, with a massive dollar shortage and with margins and haircuts rising across 
the board, as well as a sharp increase in counterparty risk. 
The S&P 500 peaked in October  2007 but has seen temporary corrections 
during the Shanghai stock market crash in late February 2007 as well as in the be-
ginning of the subprime market turmoil in July 2007. Sharp falls occurred in Jan-
uary 2008 with financial institutions announcing new writedowns and losses, before 
the Bear Stearns rescue in March 2008, and after the Lehman collapse in Septem-
ber  2008. Meanwhile, the  CDS measure of large complex financial institutions is 
characterized by the two spikes, namely during the Bearn Stearns rescue as well as 
the Lehman bankruptcy. 
As regards the emerging markets, the regional EMBI+ spreads for Asia and 
LAC have remained elevated relative to those of Europe, between 2003 and 2006 
convergence to historically low levels has been observed. With the onset of the sub-
prime crisis, some moderate widening occurred. Following the Lehman bankruptcy, 
global risk aversion sharply increased across asset classes and the regional EMBI+ 
8 After the Lehman Brothers collapse, we use the average CDS values for Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch
and Morgan Stanley for the Lehman Brothers time series data. Note also that market-traded prices such as 
CDS spreads contain a liquidity risk component – the risk that an investor may or may not be able to trade 
at a price close to the last traded price. Such risks rise during periods of stress. 514                                         Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6 
Figure 1  U.S. and Emerging Market Financial Variables 
     
 
       
 
       
Source: Bloomberg L.P. 
 
spreads jumped to over 800 basis points in late October 2008. Since then, some tight-
ening has been recorded but spreads still remained at very high levels compared to 
the pre-subprime period. 
EMBI+ and CDS spreads for individual countries, such as Brazil, Russia, and 
Turkey, exhibit similar patterns of being compressed before the subprime crisis and 
then suffering increasing widening whilst the crisis period unfolded. Stock markets 
in these countries continued their upward trend well into 2007 and 2008 with Turkey 
peaking in October 2007 and Brazil and Russia in May 2008, before the contagious 
reversal thereafter. During the financial crisis, these markets appear to move increas-
ingly in tandem as events unfold in advanced economies. While relatively small com-
pared to post-Lehman movements, these equity markets were also affected by the brief 
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Figure 2  U.S. and Emerging Market Financial Variables 
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large drops in these equity indices. Finally, it is shown in Figure 2 that the bond and 
CDS spreads, as well as equity markets in Mexico and South Africa follow similar 
price dynamics compared to those outlined above. 
4. Methodology 
The estimation is based on a multivariate GARCH framework, which allows 
for heteroskedasticity in the  data and a  time-varying correlation in the  conditional 
variance. Specifically, the Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) specification by 
Engle (2002) is adopted, which provides a generalization of the Constant Conditional 
Correlation (CCC) model by Bollerslev (1990).
9 These econometric techniques allow 
us to analyze the  co-movement of markets by inferring the  correlations of 
the  changes in the  spreads discussed above, which in turn is essential in 
understanding whether the recent episode of financial distress has become systemic. 
The DCC model is estimated in a three-stage procedure. Let rt denote an n x 1 
vector of asset returns, exhibiting a  mean of zero and the  following time-varying 
covariance: 
                                                                                          (2) 
 
9 Given the high volatility movements during the recent financial crisis, the assumption of constant condi-
tional correlation among the variables in the CCC model is not very realistic especially in times of stress
where correlations can rapidly change. Therefore, the DCC model is a better choice since correlations are 
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Here, Rt is made up from the time dependent correlations and Dt is defined as 
a diagonal matrix comprised of the standard deviations implied by the estimation of 
univariate GARCH models, which are computed separately, whereby the ith element 
is denoted as 
it h . In other words, in this first stage of the DCC estimation, we fit 
univariate GARCH models for each of the  five variables in the  specification. In 
the second stage, the intercept parameters are obtained from the transformed asset 
returns. Finally, in the third stage, the coefficients governing the dynamics of the con-
ditional correlations are estimated. Overall, the DCC model is characterized by the fol-
lowing set of equations (Engle, 2002): 
                                      (3) 
Here, S is defined as the unconditional correlation matrix of the residuals İt of 
the asset returns rt. As defined above, Rt is the time varying correlation matrix and is 
a function of Qt, which is the covariance matrix. In the matrix Qt,Ț is a vector of ones, 
A and B are square, symmetric and $is the Hadamard product. Finally, Ȝi is a weight 
parameter with the contributions of  2
1  t D  declining over time, while ți is the para-
meter associated with the squared lagged asset returns. The estimation framework is 
the same as in Frank, Gonzalez-Hermosillo and Hesse (2008). 
5. Results 
The implied correlations between the 3-month US Libor-OIS spread and EMBI+ 
bond spreads of Asia, Europe, and LAC sharply increase after the subprime crisis 
(left column of Figure 3).
10 In addition, the China stock market correction in late Feb-
ruary 2007 led to a temporary spike of the correlation measures from 0.20 to almost 
0.50. The  Lehman collapse caused the  largest increase of co-movements between 
these variables. In terms of regional differences, the Asian EMBI+ spread exhibits 
the largest correlation for the pre-subprime crisis with some exceptions, followed by 
Europe and LAC. All regional spreads co-movements jump up around the China stock 
market burst in similar magnitude, and move closely during the subprime period. 
Interestingly, the  correlation for the  LAC EMBI+ spread exhibits the  greatest rise 
immediately following the Lehman failure, compared to those of the other regions. 
These results are mirrored in the other multivariate GARCH specifications for 
the EMBI+ spreads. The relationship between changes in the S&P 500 and the EMBI 
regional bond spreads abruptly changes during the Shanghai stock market correction 
with correlation magnitudes moving to almost -0.60. Subsequently, the degree of co- 
-movement remains elevated following the beginning of the subprime crisis and peaks 
in September 2008. In terms of regional differences, it appears that the interlinkages 
10 As a robustness test, we also used the Capiello, Engle and Sheppard (2006) DCC GARCH model that
accounts for possible structural breaks in the unconditional correlation among the variables. The overall
results were similar to the Engle (2002) model adopted here. Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6                                    517 
Figure 3  Implied Correlations between U.S. and EM Financial Variables 
       
 
       
 
       
Source: Own calculations.
between the  S&P 500 and the  EMBI spread for LAC dominate the  other regional 
spreads. In addition, the relationship between the CDS default risk measure and the re-
gional bond spreads highlights a  substantial and persistent increase in correlations 
beginning in July 2007 and magnitudes remaining high throughout the crisis period. 
In the right column of Figure 3, we examine possible individual country inter-
linkages with the Libor-OIS spread. Changes in this measure are related to sovereign 
bond and CDS spreads, as well as with stock markets in Brazil, Russia, and Turkey. 
As before, the China episode in February 2007 is evident, such as market disloca-
tions during the subprime crisis and the Lehman collapse. The Bear Stearns rescue in 
March 2008 also becomes visible with co-movements sharply reversing their down-
ward trend prior to that. Brazil has the largest correlation for the bond spread, CDS, 
and stock market volatility measures during the crisis period. This could be attributed 518                                         Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6 
Figure 4  Implied Correlations between U.S. and EM Financial Variables 
       
 
         
 
          
Source: Own calculations.
 
to the fact that Brazil has a very open capital account, and has witnessed a dramatic 
increase in bond risk premia, coupled with large foreign equity outflows precipitating 
a plunge in the domestic equity market, despite obtaining an investment grade rating 
in 2008. Given the relative liquidity of foreign bond and equity markets in Brazil, 
mutual and hedge funds were able to unwind these positions to cover their domestic 
losses (or margin calls in some cases). 
Above, the correlations between the U.S. Libor-OIS spread, a proxy for fund-
ing liquidity stress, and bond risk premia and equity market volatility in Brazil, Rus-
sia, and Turkey were quantified. In what follows, we extend this analysis to include 
CDS changes for LFCIs during the recent crisis period. In the left column of Figure 4, 
spikes in the correlation patterns are less pronounced than in the case of the Libor- 
-OIS spread. Simultaneously, the co-movement among the CDS measures is highly Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6                                    519 
persistent suggesting that both liquidity and solvency aspects were central in explain-
ing financial market spillovers. 
Finally, the DCC GARCH analysis is extended to Mexico and South Africa. 
Results in the  right column of Figure 4 indicate similarities to the  findings from 
Brazil, Russia and Turkey with co-movements significantly increasing during the sub-
prime crisis period, while providing some evidence that the China stock market cor-
rection also led to temporally higher correlations. As expected and given the proximity 
of Mexico to the United States, co-movements of the Mexican financial variables are 
more pronounced with the proxies for stress in the interbank market, stock market 
volatility as well as default risk than of South Africa. 
Overall, the findings from the DCC GARCH models indicate that the notion 
of possible decoupling (in the financial markets) had been misplaced. Despite EM 
stock markets reaching their peak in November 2007, interlinkages between funding 
stress and equity markets in advanced economies and EM financial indicators be-
came highly correlated, and have seen sharp increases during specific crisis moments. 
Given the  interconnectedness of global financial markets, investors' increase in 
global risk aversion from problems in advanced economies rapidly spilled over into 
EM countries, as funds were pulled out from the latter and subsequently invested into 
the safest and most liquid assets such as mature market fixed income securities. 
In addition, co-movements between funding stress and bank default risk (ap-
proximated by the CDS measure) in advanced economies with bond spreads as well 
as stock market returns in EM countries have been fairly similar in terms of their 
magnitudes during the financial crisis. As a result, we believe that these factors are 
important when analyzing potential financial market spillovers. 
6. Conclusion 
We have analyzed the interaction between liquidity and bank solvency meas-
ures with stock, bond, and credit markets in EM economies during the recent global 
financial crisis. A multivariate GARCH model has been estimated to quantify the ex-
tent of co-movement of these financial variables across markets.  
We have found that during the period of financial turbulence, both the Libor- 
-OIS spread (a proxy of interbank money market pressure) and the CDS spread 
(a measure of bank solvency) became more correlated with EM bond, stock, and 
credit markets. These relationships became especially apparent during the Shanghai 
stock market correction, the beginning of the subprime crisis in summer 2007, the Bear 
Stearns rescue and the  Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. These results suggest that 
the notion of a possible decoupling of financial markets has been misplaced, and in 
fact, interlinkages between funding stress and equity markets in advanced economies 
and emerging market financial indicators were highly correlated, and have seen sharp 
increases during specific crisis moments. 
We have not analyzed the exact causal relationships among the financial vari-
ables in advanced and EM countries. With daily high-frequency data, there are likely 
to be significant feedback loops that can affect the causal relationships. We reserve 
this topic for future research.  
The analysis in this article offers some lessons for policymakers. Perhaps 
the key message is that spillovers need to be closely attended to, especially in light of 
the interconnectedness of global financial markets. 520                                         Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6 
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